Wednesday, 25 April 2007

Modernisation and Dissent?


Through the eyes of a friend, I took a glance at the Middle Kingdom’s economic modernization and its implications on political dissent among China’s new middle class.

China, China, China -- it dominates our headlines, we are told 'it is the defining power of our century representing a change of the international order and the beginning of the end of US unipolar hegemony'. The Chinese economic miracle is the stuff of legends; in the last 30 years, more people have witnessed an increase in their standard of living than at any period in human history.
With the exception of the occasional rural protest, mass dissent in China has arguably been crushed since 1989. Observers argue that unless economic growth slips behind 4-5% for a few consecutive years, China's new middle class will remain silent and will not cry out for political representation.

Take my old friend Mr Wang as an example. Mr Wang is the eldest of 8 children, one of his siblings died in infancy from the common cold and another perished from malnutrition at the height of Mao's Great Leap Forward. Mr Wang's family were good socialist workers who came from a long line of peasants -- they embraced the People's Liberation Army as saviours when they took the family's village in the 1940s. The family moved to Beijing, gained residency and took up positions in one of the top state-run work units in Beijing. Life was looking up for Mao's children of the revolution and they invested great faith in the Proletarian Dictatorship as the new guardian's of the Mandate of Heaven.

Then the 'Great Leap Forward'; this was a disastrous attempt by Mao to overtake British steel production within 15 years, enjoy bumper grain harvests and service phenomenal debt to the Soviet Union. It was a total disaster -- within 5 years of the Communist Land Redistribution, the peasants were forced to join 'People's Communes', all property now belonged to the State and upwards of 30 million people perished. Family life was all but eradicated. As local officials grossly exagerrated harvest figures to please the party leadership, China lost its capacity to feed itself.

Mr Wang remembers being forced to scrape bark off trees and boil grass for his family's sustenance as a boy. Yet even as his 2 siblings passed away and as China starved to death, Mr Wang still possessed an enduring faith in the party embodied in the teachings of Chairman Mao. "What choice did I have? What else did we know? Without the Party, there was only Chiang Kai Shek and the imperialists in the West", he remembers.

In the Cultural Revolution, Mr Wang joined the Chinese military and deemed himself fortunate to be posted as a kitchen hand, "I could eat meat everyday”, he explains, “in the kitchen we always got the best rations". Safe from the political upheavals raging through Beijing, life in the People's Liberation Army saved my friend's political skin. After leaving the army, Mr Wang became a floor worker in a Beijing factory, eventually becoming his workshop’s party secretary and secured promotion to a management position after the company signed a joint-venture agreement with a prominent global corporation.

Yes, things were looking up for Mr Wang. He is a direct beneficiary of Deng Xiaoping’s reform and he now owns a townhouse in Beijing and drives a European car, travels abroad and retired at age 50. Yet Mr Wang says he feels “betrayed” by the Communist Party. “During the Mao era when we were promised a communist paradise, he dies and we get capitalism with authoritarian rule. Then all those young people were slaughtered at Tiananmen and it broke my heart. There is no point in even caring about politics anymore, you might as well just go out and get rich, that’s why so many former dissident leaders are now business people and don’t give a stuff about politics”.

Mr Wang is still a member of the Party, still laments the loss of dissent, just returned from yet another trip abroad and is contemplating his next car…

Tuesday, 24 April 2007

PRC to Develop Super-jumbo


Chinese state media have reported the PRC's ambition to develop its own super-jumbo, potentially upsetting the effective global duopoly shared between Boeing and Airbus. Chinese aviation officials, bureaucrats and media have painted the move as a major step in nation building and may prove unsettling to Western corporations and governments.


It is unclear if the proposed super-jumbo will be primarily about satisfying the increasing domestic market or if it will target foreign aviation markets. The mainland market has proven consistently lucrative for Boeing and Airbus as increasingly heavy pocketed consumers turn to air travel. In the last 10 years, 138 million Chinese travel by plane every year, this represents an increase of 105%. This demand has translated to 60 Chinese orders for its new Dreamliner, and Airbus has received 100 orders including 5 for its new A380 super-jumbo.
Source: The Guardian

Wednesday, 7 February 2007

Chinese Anti-Satellite test a win for Realism


Beijing's recent foray into long range missile technology threatening to disable the US war machine in a matter of 60 minutes is a product of strategic calculation by increasingly astute cadres in an increasingly assertive PRC.


For years the Chinese have asked Washington to sign a treaty guaranteeing the peaceful use of space yet successive administrations have refused this benign request. Last year, far from quelling increasing global discontent with unbridled US power, Washington's Space Command called for US military domination of space by the year 2020 .


To put it simply, the Chinese have rightly had enough. They have tried engaging Washington through diplomacy and attempted to strengthen international law in the face of the hegemon's outright refusal. In return for pure ideological arrogance and political stubborness, the Bush administration has been rewarded with China's confirmation as a military (and economic), well, superpower.


China has followed the classical Hobbesian maxim that 'life is nasty, brutish and short' and in a bout of the most prudent Machiavellian statecraft , Beijing has sought to guarantee her own survival. The anarchic state of post-911 world politics means that in the absence of benign hegemonic leadership, states are increasingly forced to turn their backs on the international system and fend for themselves. Iran, North Korea and indeed the People's Republic stand out as pertinent reminders of our new, post Cold War, post-911 world order.


However, what separates Beijing from the seemingly tin pot lunatic leadership that coming from Pyongyang and Tehran? China is looking to her imperial traditions - a time when tributary relationships governed China's relations with the world. In November 2006, Beijing hosted a summit of African leaders. This remarkable diplomatic ensemble effectively cemented the PRC's efforts in ensuring the world's most impoverished continent remains a network of states dependent on 'benevolence' from the Middle Kingdom in the form of aid, trade and benefits stemming from China's massive reserve of foreign currency and much hyped economic boom.

A friend of mine in Beijing works for a company that is about to send him off to Sierra Leone to build Chinese funded roads for the wartorn nation. Another friend of mine was recently employed as an interpreter for the Zimbabwean government negotiating a fertilizer contract (of all things) with the Chinese government. This is all arguably hard evidence that Africa specifically, along with Latin America and a whopping chunk of Asia is entangled in the modern equivalent of imperial Chinese tributary networks.


Beijing's recent long range missile test should be seen for what it is - a nice little up yours to the Bush administration for one, and a perfectly logical step for a state such as China to guarantee its survival in the wake of consistent snubs by Washington. This is a victory for Machiavelli, Hobbes, Clausewitz and not to mention Sun Zi. This is a victory for realism and a victory for those seeking an end the very short lived American century.


To see the US Space Command's Vision for 2020 visit http://www.middlepowers.org/gsi/docs/vision_2020.pdf

Chinese missile test creates dangerous levels of space junk


The PRC's much reported entry into the race for the militarisation of space last month has allegedly added up to 800 more pieces of debris orbiting the planet.


Scientists contend that Beijing's anti-satellite test has contributed to the marked possibility of a potentially dangerous collision with satellites or space craft and has exacerbated NASA's already pertinent safety concerns regarding future missions.


China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs has so far declined to comment regarding the environmental implications of its January test.


What on Earth Happened to Chen Liang Yu?

With the People’s Republic gearing up for the 2008 Summer Olympics and a new lunar year upon us, I put together some analysis looking at some key issues facing the PRC in the Year of the Pig and on China’s fight against corruption and the succession battle raging behind the scenes between Jiang Zemin and heir apparent, Hu Jintao.


The Middle Kingdom has long been known for its power struggles and particularly intense succession battles for the spoils of the realm. The intense rivalry among Qing Emperor Kangxi’s 35 children for the Dragon Throne that dominated the final decades of Kangxi’s otherwise spectacular reign certainly springs to mind when pondering the fate of today’s Chinese political elite.

Many in the West triumph at the notion that China is so liberal these days you can find a Starbucks open seven days a week in the Forbidden City itself. Get rid of any illusions you might have had about waves of Marxist liberalism sweeping away China's imperial traditions -- the Chinese Communist Party is no different. Mao himself was notorious not only for brushing his teeth with green tea; he was a genius at winning successive skirmishes against pretenders for the party leadership. China still operates under the cloud of the Mandate of Heaven and the dynastic cycle – it is shackled to these core historical identity narratives.

Countless China watchers (myself included), rejoiced when Jiang Zemin seemingly gave the party leadership to so called liberal, Hu Jintao. We all boldly predicted some truth and maybe a little bit of justice for the victims of 1989, increased freedom of the press and god forbid we even pondered for a brief moment that Hu may establish diplomatic relations with the Vatican.
Five years after what was prematurely billed by so many "China's first bloodless succession" and after a wave of serious allegations of forced organ removal from Falun Gong practicioners and over 30,000 full time Police employed to spy on China’s web surfers, we learn that perhaps Hu isn't the grand liberal we took him for.

Before we continue to lambaste Hu’s record in office, let us first and foremost remember that Jiang's not dead yet and with the best healthcare in the land, he’s not going anywhere. Remember the immediate aftermath of 1989, when Deng Xiaoping handed the reins to Jiang? It was all for show – Jiang Zemin couldn't lift a political finger until Deng's death in 1997. Deng was still the undisputed Emperor of an ancient order even though his only official position was Chairman of the All-China Bridge Players Federation. Deng was fundamentally the father figure, the enduring link to the Long Marchers and a critical part of a dying octogenarian breed that guarded the party’s source of legitimacy in the myth, legend and romanticism of the Dadu River.

It seems that meticulously orchestrated corruption scandals are essential weapons in the CCP leadership’s power struggles and succession battles. They come along once every couple of years or so much in the same way as bootleg DVDs are bulldozed every time the PRC holds talks with US trade officials. In the last decade China has put a mayor on death row, the mayor of Beijing in prison, a range of officials were incarcerated for getting their hands dirty in Fujian province’s lucrative smuggling trade, and only last year we saw Chen Liang Yu, Shanghai Party Boss and vital Jiang Zemin supporter arrested and publicly shamed for embezzlement of superannuation funds in what was then cracked up as China’s largest anti-corruption operation that netted up to twenty top Shanghai officials and powerbrokers.

Observers were quick to point out that in arresting Chen, Hu was responding to a prolonged assault by Jiang’s Shanghai faction which saw the release of ‘Jiang Zemin Thought’ into party canon and a wave of ‘Three Represents’ propaganda. Hu shot back with the pertinent release of his ‘Eight Virtues and Eight Vices’ as some kind of new ethical code of Marxist conduct and soon after its release sent the Shanghai faction to the dry-cleaners. Chen was promptly dismissed as Mayor and expelled from the all important Central Committee and is now presumably under house arrest and jockeying to be bailed out by well placed cadres loyal to Jiang.

Yet what has happened to the Shanghai billions? What about transparent trials for the accused and due sentencing? What are the wider implications for the fight against corruption entrenched throughout all levels of the party-state machine and the cadre system? In short, proving that last year’s anti-corruption efforts were all about Hu ruffling his tail feathers, nothing has changed; graft, fraud and embezzlement of state-owned enterprises and public coffers continues to be rampant – ‘everyone else is doing it, so why can’t I?’ ponders a party secretary in some insignificant rural prefecture. Talk to anyone in the peasantry and they will tell you officials still collect taxes under the auspices of public works that never see the light of day.

I will never forget meeting an offical from a senior government department on a recent delegation to Beijing. During customary banquet small-talk I remarked that her English was remarkable and how reassured I was to know that China’s public servants are the elite of the elite and recruited exclusively on merit. She smiled and proceeded to casually remark that her husband has been working in a related policy unit and he spoke to a leader on her behalf and she never sat the placement exam. I was utterly gobsmacked. From top to bottom – corruption is chronic.

Arguably since the establishment of the CCP, aside from using corruption to satisfy immediate ambitions and crush political opponents, China’s leaders have shown they are powerless and subsequently unwilling to tackle one of the nation’s largest obstacles to the long-term development of good governance. Deng Xiaoping tried in the initial period of post-Mao reforms – he demanded public servants re-skill, become literate and attend professional development classes so the cadres simply bribed the teachers to accept fake enrolments and produce fraudulent qualifications. Furthermore, Deng attempted to make older generation cadres ‘retire’, but they simply got an extra months salary per annum, kept their government cars, maintained access to official briefings while their children were given senior public service positions.

Yet the senior party leadership has no choice – if the benefits of development are to be enjoyed by a wider section of the population, corruption must be seriously tackled at all levels of public administration. China’s rise and rise has long been hailed as a victory for a more liberal society and while savvy consumers in Beijing and Shanghai may be driving Ferrari’s and listening to the latest Jay Chou number on their iPods, the fruits of prosperity have been remarkably slow in reaching the provinces west of the Yangtze River Valley – the overwhelming majority of people in the central and western regions scrape by on a mere US$1.76 per day.

Recent evidence suggests that the CCP is acutely aware of the problems posed by uneven economic development, hordes of workers made redundant by inefficient state-owned enterprises and naked corruption; by the Ministry of Public Security’s own admission in 2005 there were approximately 87,000 demonstrations throughout the provinces representing an increase of 6% from the year before. Responding to acute unrest and to what some have termed ‘a crisis of values and honesty’ plaguing modern China, the Central Committee of the CCP declared in stark Confucian language that ‘social harmony’ is the number one policy issue to be addressed by the cadres at this year’s party congress.

Whether the Central Committee’s rediscovery of China’s Confucian traditions translates to a crackdown on corruption and an increase of benevolent governance remains to be seen; foreign journalists have responded cautiously to the CCP’s promise of greater freedom during the 2008 Olympics and pro-democracy activists fear a continued assault on dissent and criticism of the government. Former Shanghai party boss Chen Liang Yu is presumably spending the Chinese festive season awaiting a no doubt cunningly orchestrated sentence, at the beginning of a new lunar calendar Jiang Zemin essentially still reigns supreme – as Hu Jintao ponders his next move in a succession battle that is proving vital in delivering continued legitimacy to the Communist Party of China.