Security analysts have long pondered the implications of any military conflict between mainland China and Taiwan. Any conflict has been presented as the gravest threat to international security short of a North Korean or Iranian nuclear strike. The Taiwan issue is a relic from old Cold War security paradigms intertwined with a renewed mainland nationalism and an assertive leadership in Taipei. Furthermore, the international community is ill-equipped to intervene in a conflict involving a sovereign state and an entity effectively unrecognised by the majority of states.
While not wanting to play down the severity of the issue nor the entrenched sentiment of the mainland and the Taiwanese alike, I argue that the issue isn't as clear cut as is often portrayed in the international media. It is not as if hardline Chinese are gagging to invade the tiny island, nor are the overwhelming majority of Taiwanese busting to declare independence.
An expert in Chinese strategic policy argues that since economic modernisation and the continued pressures associated with Taiwanese growth, the mainland has been exercising a policy of 'tightening the economic noose' in Taiwan and Hong Kong. Simply, cheap labour and the mainland manufacturing base firmly hold Taiwanese prosperity hostage to the western side of the Taiwan straits. Roughly 75% of the Taiwanese economy is dependent on the mainland and any declaration of independence threatens to undermine the quintessential liberal-democratic success story that is Taiwan.
Furthermore, public opinion in Taiwan is deeply divided on independence and indeed the wider fabric of Taiwanese identity is starkly wedged between loyalty to a distinctly 'Chinese' culture and to a Taiwanese construct of identity. A British survey of more than 3000 Taiwanese residents demonstrated that 45% support independence, 45% support the status quo/reunification and the remainding 10% support becoming an American state! Most Taiwanese are at a loss to identify themselves with any particular cultural construct or nation-state -- some claim to be Chinese, others Chinese-Taiwanese, Taiwanese-Chinese and some Taiwanese.
It seems that Taiwan's pro-independence President Chen Shui-Bian holds many of the cards that will determine the future of China's nationalism and indeed the wider survival of multilateral security. Once again, opinion in Taiwan is divided regarding support for Chen's government and its policy priorities. The trend from most reputable opinion polls points to 50% support for Chen and 50% for the opposition, pro-reunification Guo Min Dang party.
To make reading the tea leaves that much harder, Chen's presidency has been rocked with serious corruption scandals and allegations of graft and bribery have dogged the First Family. As the bearer of the highest office in the land, Chen is immune from prosecution yet mass protests calling for his resignation continue to undermine his reform agenda.
My concern is that whilst the corruption scandals continue to dominate headlines and threaten Chen's legacy, the president may use the independence card to distract public attention and manipulate global interest in Beijing stemming from the 2008 Olympics. There is still talk of a referendum on a new Taiwanese constitution that is the alleged forerunner to a declaration of independence and I fear that in the spirit of desperate politicians, Chen may turn to this as a means to his legacy.
A Taiwanese declaration in the Olympics year would certainly test the patience of Beijing. I cannot imagine an assertive military response in the middle of 2008 -- with 30,000 foreign journalists in Beijing garnering global attention, a missile strike threatening the 'self-determination of the Taiwanese people' wouldn't look good for a nation trying to present a benevolent image for the 21st century.
With the Olympics and increasing domestic pressure on Chen, 2008 could be a dangerous year for cross strait relations. It will be a year to watch at both ends of the straits.
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